RECENT CASES
On the other hand, if the plaintiff's claim be regarded as essentially the same as a suit
for malicious prosecution, it can be said that he has a separate cause of action. The Illinois Civil Practice Act does not require joinder of separate causes of action even though
they arise out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence, 7 and consequently the
prior suit would not bar a subsequent proceeding. As a practical matter, however, it
would seem desirable to require assertion of any claim for counsel fees to be made in
the principal action, since substantially the same issues will have to be litigated in both
cases.
Bailments-Automobiles-Interpretation of Provisions on Parking Lot Ticket
Limiting Bailee's Liability-[Massachusetts].-The plaintiff parked his automobile in
the defendant's parking lot, paid the required charge to the attendant, and left the
keys in the automobile at the attendant's request. The attendant gave him a stub
containing provisions exempting the defendant from liability for loss or damage to the
car and stating that no attendant would be at the lot after 6:oo p.m. When the plaintiff returned at 6:15 there was no attendant in the lot and the automobile had been
stolen. After the automobile was recovered in a damaged condition, the plaintiff
brought this action to recover for the harm caused by the negligence of the defendant's
agent. On appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, held, that because the defendant's
agent had not brought the provisions to the attention of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
had not read them, they cannot be given effect. judgment affirmed. Sandler v. Cominonwealt Station Co.,
The position of the court in the instant case is supported by that taken by courts
dealing with other informal bailments2 such as the checking of parcels and baggage3
17cc.... any plaintiff .
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. may join any causes of action whether legal or equitable .....
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Ill. Rev. Stat. (1939) c. 11o, § 168 (italics added). Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. § 723c (1941), is also phrased in permissive terms.

N.E. (2d) 389 (Mass. 1940).
court found the lot operator in the present case to be a bailee for hire. The parking
lot cases fall into two groups depending upon the manner of doing business: (i) where there
is no surrender of possession of the automobile to the lot operator, the owner parking the car
by himself and locking it if he wishes, the courts have declared the relationship to be that of a
lease of parking space or a license to park, requiring no duty of care on the part of the operator.
Ashby v. Tolhurst, ['9371 2 K.B. 242; Ex parte Mobile Light & R. Co., 211 Ala. 525, 101
So. I77 (1924); Lord v. Oklahoma Fair Ass'n, 95 Okla. 294, 2i9 Pac. 713 (1923); (2) where
there has been a delivery of possession by the car owner to the lot operator, as evidenced by
the owner's leaving the keys in the car, receiving a stub, and permitting the lot attendant to
park the automobile, the courts have found the operator to be a bailee for hire. Doherty v.
Ernst, 284 Mass. 341, 187 N.E. 620 (1933); Beetson v. Hollywood Athletic Club, iog Cal. App.
'30
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715, 293 Pac. 821 (1930); cf. Galowitz v. Magner, 208 App. Div. 6, 203 N.Y. Supp.
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Osborne v. Cline, 263 N.Y. 434, 189 N.E. 483 (1934); Jones, The Parking Lot Cases, 27
Geo. L. J. x62 (1938). A bailee for hire owes that degree of care which a prudent man would
take with respect to his own property. Keenan Hotel Co. v. Funk, 93 Ind.App. 677, x77 N.E.
364 (193r); Meine v. Mossier Auto Exch., Inc., io La. App. 65, 120 So. 533 (1929).
3Jones v. Great Northern R. Co., 68 Mont. 231, 217 Pac. 673 (1923); Curtis v. United
Transfer Co., 167 Cal. 112, 138 Pac. 726 (r914); Springer v. Westcott, x66 N.Y. 117, 59 N.E.

693 (19oz). Contra: Noyes v. Hines,
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409 (1920).
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and the parking of automobiles in public garages. 4 Since the stub is usually small and
no writing or signature is required, the owner of the property does not examine it. He
considers it a mere receipt or identification rather than a statement of contract terms.
Courts have not held such provisions binding upon the owner unless the bailee called
them to his attention, or unless he actually read them.s The holding of the court in the
instant case may be contrasted with the position taken by courts dealing with more
formal transactions. Thus in cases involving acceptance of bills of lading, 6 warehouse
receipts,7 steamship tickets, 8 and insurance policies9 the party is usually said to have
had constructive notice of the provisions. Even in these latter cases, however, the
terms must be set forth in such a way that a reasonably careful person would read
them. Limitations on the back of steamship tickets, not clearly referred to on the
front, are not given effect;o and in many states limiting provisions in accident insurance policies are ineffective if printed in type smaller than a minimum stipulated by
statute."
If the plaintiff in the instant case had actually seen the limiting provision, the court
would have been faced with the additional problem of the enforceability of the provi4 Maynard v. James, iog Conn. 365, 146 Ad. 614 (1929); Dietrich v. Peters, 28 Ohio App.
427, 162 N.E. 753 (1928); Hoel v. Flour City Fuel & Transfer Co., 144 Minn. 280, i75 N.W.
300 (i9ig); cf. Parris v. Jaquith, 70 Colo. 63, 197 Pac. 750 (1920).
5 Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Rehm, 177 So. 79 (La. App. 1937); Spooner v. Starkman, [i937]
D.L.R. 582 (Ont.); Syndicate Parking, Inc. v. General Exch. Ins. Corp., 17 Ohio Law Abs.
596 (Ohio App. i934); cf. Galowitz v. Magner, 208 App. Div. 6, 203 N.Y. Supp. 421 (1924).
Contra: U Drive & Tour, Ltd. v. System Auto Parks, Ltd., 28 Cal. App. (2d) 782, 71 P. (2d)
354 (1937); see Ashby v. Tolhurst, [1937] 2 K.B. 242, 252.
6 American Ry. Express Co. v. Lindenburg, 26o U.S. 584 (1923); Oakdale Farms, Inc. v.
Rutland R. Co., io4 Vt. 279, x58 Ad. 678 (1932); Davis v. Cayuga Operating Co., Inc., 217
App. Div. 675, 216 N.Y. Supp. i86 (1926); cf. Paine Furniture Co. v. Acme Transfer & Storage
Co., Inc., 290 Mass. 195, 195 N.E. 302 (1935); Uniform Bills of Lading Act § 1o, 4 U.L.A.
2

(1922) § io.

7 Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Los Angeles Warehouse Co., i6 Cal. App. (2d) 737, 6i P.
(2d) 510 (1936); Taussig v. Bode & Haslett, 134 Cal. 26o, 66 Pac. 259 (igoi); Central Storage

Warehouse Co. v. Pickering, 114 Ohio St. 76, xSi N.E. 39 (1926); Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act § 3, 3 U.L.A. (1922) § 3.
8O'Flaherty v. Cunard S.S. Co., 281 Mass. 447, 183 N.E. 712 (i933); Fonseca v. Cunard
S.S. Co., 153 Mass. 553, 27 N.E. 665 (i8gi); Murray v. Cunard S.S. Co., 235 N.Y. 162, 139
N.E. 226 (1923).

Long v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 257 Mass. 240, 153 N.E. 792 (1926); Benzinger v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 317 Pa. 561, 176 At. 922 (1935); Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Mullins, 218 Ky. 473, 291
S.W. 76o (1927); Davem v. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 241 N.Y. 318, 15o N.E. 129
(1925).

2oMaibrunn v. Hamburg-American S.S. Co., 77 F. (2d) 304 (C.C.A. 2d 193s); Baer v. North
German Lloyd, 69 F. (2d) 88 (C.C.A. 2d 1934); The Majestic, 166 U.S. 375 (1897).
11Mass. Ann. Laws (1932) c. 175, § 1o8; I1l. Rev. Stat. (1939) c. 73, § 968 (identical language construed in Porter v. Continental Casualty Co., 277 Ill. App. 492 (1934)); N.Y. Cons.
Laws (McKinney, i94o) c. 28, § x64(2) (construed in Hodgson v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co.,
182 App. Div. 381, 169 N.Y. Supp. 28 (19I8)).
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sion. It is often held that a bailee for hire, such as a common carrier12 or warehouseman,' 3 cannot exempt himself from liability for his own negligence; these decisions are
made without consideration of whether the bailor actually saw the provisions.X4 Neither of the grounds upon which these decisions rest, however, seems to be applicable to
the instant case. The parking lot operator does not occupy the "monopolistic" position of a common carrier, s nor does exemption of the operator from liability for carex6
lessness endanger members of the public, as does exemption of the common carrier.
Conversations with parking lot operators in Chicago indicate that the competitive nature of the business affords considerable protection to customers. The common usages
of repairing, free of charge, all damage to automobiles caused by lot attendants and
putting unlocked cars into garages when uncalled for at closing time prevail, despite
liability exemption clauses. It seems preferable to permit the parties to contract freely
in the manner which they conceive to be best suited to their interests and to invalidate
only those agreements ihich are clearly detrimental to the public welfare.17 If they
agree that the bailment shall terminate at a definite time, this will only require the
owner to take the risk of his delay in getting back to the lot. Even if they contract to
exempt the operator from all liability, enforcement of this provision will only shift the
burden of insuring against risk of loss from the lot operator to the car owner.

Bonds-Multiple Collection Clauses-Right of American Bondholder of Canadian
Corporation to Recover Face Value of Bonds in United States Dollars-[Federal].The defendant, a Canadian corporation, issued a series of bonds payable in "dollars
....at the Bank of Montreal, in the City of Montreal, Canada, or in the City of New
1

Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, z7 Wall. (U.S.) 357 (1873); The Ansaldo San Georgio I v.

Rheinstrom Bros. Co., 294 U.S. 494 (x935); The Arabic, 5o F. (2d) 96 (C.C.A. 2d 1931); cf.
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran, 9 F. (2d) 724 (C.C.A. 2d 1925). For ocean bills of
lading see the Harter Act, 27 Stat. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C.A. § io (1928), construed in The Korea Maru, 274 Fed. 509 (C.C.A. 9th 1921). For inland bills of lading see Uniform Bills of
Lading Act § 3,4 U.L.A. (1922) § 3, construed in Straus v. Canadian Pacific R. Co., 254 N.Y.
407, 173 N.E. 564 (1930).
13 See Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act §3, 3 U.L.A. (1922) §3, construed in Adler v.
Bush Terminal Co., i6i Misc. 509, 291 N.Y. Supp. 435 (S.
Ct. 1937), aff'd without opinion 250
App. Div. 730, 294 N.Y. Supp. 726 (1937); Kidd & Co. v. North American Provision Co., 249
Ill. App. 28 (i928).
'4 Downs v. Sley System Garages, 129 Pa. Super. 68, i94 AtI. 772 (i937); Keenan Hotel Co.
v. Funk, 93 Ind. App. 677, 177 N.E. 364 (93i); Sporsem v. First Nat'l Bank of Poulsbo, 133
Wash. 199, 233 Pac. 641 (1925); Scott Auto & Supply Co. v. McQueen, iii Okla. 107, 226
Pac. 372 (1925); Weinberger v. Werremeyer, 224 Ill. App. 217 (1922); Renfroe v. Fouche, 26

Ga. App. 340, io6 S.E. 303

(1921);

Pilson v. Tip-Top Auto Co., 67 Ore. 528, 136 Pac. 642

(i913).
ISRailroad Co.v.Lockwood, 17 Wall. (U.S.) 357,378-79 (1873); Willis,The Right of Bailees
to Contract against Liability for Negligence, 2o Harv. L. Rev. 297, 310 (i9o7); 86 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 772, 777 (1938).
x6Willis, op. cit. supra note i5.
X7See Santa Fe, P. &P. R. Co. v. Grant Bros. Construction Co., 228 U.S. 177, 188 (1913);
5 Williston, Contracts § 1629A (rev. ed. 1937); Rest., Contracts §§ 574-75 (I932).

